Seven Months That Changed World

Seven months of war drastically changed the assessment of Ukraine’s role in Europe’s collective security system, while Russia debunked the myth of its power

The year 2022, which became the year of a major war on European soil in the 21st century, incredibly accelerated political processes, and September added to the speed, although it would seem that the peak was reached.

Despite the apparent deterioration of US–Russia relations or, on the contrary, in view of it, there was still zero possibility in February that the Kremlin and the White House would agree on some strategic issues, while it could be expected that the price of agreement could be the demand for Ukraine’s future neutrality. Vladimir Putin decided to improve the negotiation positions, wanting to demonstrate the triumphant defeat of the Ukrainian army and the rapid change of power the Kyiv government to a pro-Russian government. That would have indicated the considerable capabilities of the Russian Federation to solve its problems by force, making its opponents urgently seek broad compromises with this serious and dangerous player.

The 24 February invasion became a genuine revelation for active participants and observers, dramatically changing the perception of Russia’s real potential, both purely military and administrative, with a complete reassessment of the political prospects of this state that claims to influence world processes. It is Ukraine that we must thank for the qualitative breakdown of assessments of the Russian reality and its future. At the same time, the world discovered Ukraine and its people, who proved to be capable of an unprecedented level of resistance in this seemingly hopeless situation. But the Ukrainians not only preserved their hope for victory. They also convinced their wary and fearful partners of its irreversibility.

This breakthrough occurred in the spring when the Russians were forced to withdraw from the Kyiv region and the north of Ukraine in general, giving up their “blitzkrieg.” At that time, the European Union, while strengthening its sanctions policy against Russia, already launched a process of symbolic support for the country that had fallen victim to large-scale aggression. Brussels responded to the 28 February application on Ukraine’s fast-track to join the EU, and after all the necessary formalities had been met, Ukraine was given EU candidate status on 23 June. At the same time, at the beginning of April, European Parliament President Roberta Metsola, followed by European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, personally visited Kyiv, where continuous heavy gunfire had been heard recently. At the same time, Boris Johnson and Andrzej Duda visited the Ukrainian capital on their programme, launching the tradition of Western politicians’ visits to Kyiv.

On 26 April, at the U.S. Ramstein Air Base in Germany, a meeting of the Ukraine Defence Contact Group was held for the first time, moderated by American military leaders who were among the representatives of four dozen countries. That moment indicated clearly that Ukraine would not be left alone to face Russia, which flaunts its army as supposedly the second strongest military power in the world. In the course of hostilities, Western partners were one by one lifting restrictions on the supply of one or another type of weapons to Ukraine.

In the summer, heavy battles were fought on the fronts, but the contact line hardly changed. The advance of Russian troops was measured in hundreds of metres per week and only in certain areas. The ability of the Ukrainian defence forces to deter the enemy, which had a multiple fire advantage, continued to impress. It seemed that there would be a protracted, painful confrontation.

The September offensive of Ukrainian troops, resulting in the liberation of almost the entire Kharkiv region, and the catastrophic collapse of the Russian front in the north of the Donetsk region, marked a sharp increase in the dynamics of the confrontation, victorious expectations from Ukraine, and great skepticism about Russia’s ability to hold the occupied territories. The attitude towards Putin at the summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation in Samarkand on 15 September was indicative. The prime ministers of Turkey and India, the leader of China, and even the leaders of the countries of Central Asia, traditionally dependent on Russia, did not conceal that they no longer see the Russian president as a defining figure. At the same time, wishes to speed up the end of the war were expressed in conversations with Putin.

The Kremlin chose a non-standard way to force Ukraine to make peace. Mobilisation was announced, which is partial only in words but in practice shocked the entire Russian society who was expecting victorious news from TV screens, not being ready to personally join the war and risk their lives and those of their loved ones.

At the same time, Putin “gave the go-ahead” to speed up the accession of the occupied territories to Russia. Obviously, this cunning plan was supposed to turn the situation upside down, to strangely turn the war of aggression into a defensive war, and therefore supposedly a fair war. And since the threat to Russian territory prompts the use of all means of its protection, the question of using nuclear weapons was up in the air. Putin himself warned menacingly that “this is not a bluff.” In a losing position, the Russian leader decided to raise the stakes as much as possible and exacerbate the escalation even more.

The Ukrainian leadership responded with a public refusal in advance to deal with Putin and conduct any negotiations with him, as well as with a demonstrative submission of an application to join NATO under an accelerated procedure. This is a rather symbolic step, but it has caused a real reaction of support. The joint statement was made by nine leaders of Central and Eastern European countries: the Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, North Macedonia, Montenegro, Poland, Romania, and Slovakia. They spoke in favour of Ukraine’s Euro-Atlantic prospects and called on all the Alliance members to “significantly increase military aid to Ukraine.” Canada expressed similar support.

Meanwhile, Russia has continued to raise the degree of escalation. The Kremlin’s new approach to the war took visible shape on 10 October when Ukraine experienced strikes on civilian infrastructure on a scale unprecedented since the beginning of the war. Energy facilities were hit by high-precision missile weapons and UAVs causing electricity supply problems in many regions across the country. The next day, the attack was repeated on a slightly smaller scale, and since then the energy sector has been suffering daily from the enemy’s attempts to destroy it. The goal is clear: the life of Ukrainians during the upcoming cold season must become unbearable. Such actions have all the signs of a war crime as they are directed against the civilian population.

Another point is the active involvement of the Islamic Republic of Iran in the crimes of the Putin regime. Shahed-136 Iranian kamikaze drones became an important part of the massive attack on Ukraine. Renamed by the Russians as “Geran-2” and launched by dozens at once, they hit the population and civilian objects. In addition, Iran’s export of weapons of this type violates UN Resolution 2231. Although official representatives of IRI deny the fact of handing over UAVs to Russia, there is enough evidence to the contrary. Given Tehran’s close links with Islamist terrorist groups, the risks of the use of kamikaze drones in other parts of the world are a very likely prospect that should be considered, primarily by Israelis, but also by Europeans.

Eight months into the full-scale war, the Ukrainian army has largely switched to the use of Western weapons. Large batches of modern NATO-standard weapons have been ordered in advance, and the combat experience of the Armed Forces of Ukraine has no equal. Ukraine, shielding Europe from the aggression coming from the east, is already an important element of the unified European defence. September and early October showed just how effective this element is becoming on the battlefield. At the moment when Ukraine–NATO relations will finally be formalised by full-fledged membership, its contribution to the security of Europe and the world will be even more significant.

It must be noted that Vladimir Putin’s contribution to Europe’s rethinking of its security and Ukraine’s role in this security system is invaluable. Of course, nobody will thank him.

Leonid Shvets